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In this article, we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents, each
of which has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets, i.e.,
being covered by some set. Each set is assumed to have a fixed cost. We develop several
approximately efficient strategyproofmechanisms that decide, after soliciting the declared
bids by all elements, which elements will be covered, which sets will provide the coverage
to these selected elements, and how much each element will be charged. For single-cover
set cover games, we present a mechanism that is at least 1dmax -efficient, i.e., the total
valuation of all selected elements is at least 1dmax fraction of the total valuation produced
by any mechanism. Here, dmax is the maximum size of the sets. For multi-cover set cover
games, we present a budget-balanced strategyproof mechanism that is 1dmaxHdmax -efficient
under reasonable assumptions. Here, Hn is the harmonic function. For the set cover games
when both sets and elements are selfish agents, we show that a cross-monotonic payment-
sharing scheme does not necessarily induce a strategyproof mechanism.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivations and background
In the past, an indispensable and implicit assumption on algorithm design for interconnected computers was that all
participating computers (called agents) are cooperative: they will behave exactly as instructed. This assumption is being
shattered by the emergence of the Internet, as it provides a platform for distributed computing with agents belonging to
independent and self-interested organizations, whomay diverge from the prescribed algorithm tomaximize their own ben-
efits. This gives rise to a newchallenge that demands the study of algorithmicmechanismdesign, the sub-field of algorithmde-
signunder the assumption that all agents are selfish (i.e., they only care about their ownbenefitswithout consideration for the
global performances or fairness issues) and yet rational (i.e., theywill always choose their actions tomaximize their benefits).
A standard economic model for the design and analysis of scenarios in which the participants act according to their own
self-interests is as follows. Assume that there are n agents {1, 2, . . . , i, . . . , n}, and each agent i has some private information
ti, called its type. For example, an agent could be a bidder in an auction, and its type is its valuation of an auctioned item.
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et al. (2005) [19]∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Computer Science, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL, USA. Tel.: +1 3125675207; fax: +1 3125675067.
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For direct-revelation mechanisms, the strategy of each agent i is to declare its type, and it may choose to report a carefully
designed lie to influence the outcome of the game to its liking. For any vector t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) of reported types, the
mechanism computes an output o as well as a payment pi for each agent i. For each possible output o, agent i’s preference is
defined by a valuation function vi(ti, o). The utility of agent i for the outcomeof the game is defined to beui(o) = vi(o)+pi(o).
An agent is called rational, if it always picks its best strategy tomaximize its own utility. If the strategy picked by an agent
is the best strategy regardless of what other agents do, the strategy picket by the agent is called the dominant strategy. A
vector of strategies (where each agent picks a strategy) is called a Nash equilibrium if no agent can deviate from its chosen
strategy to improve its utility when all other agents keep their strategies unchanged. Obviously, a strategy vector where
each agent chooses a dominant strategy is always a Nash equilibrium. A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if reporting
its type truthfully is a dominant strategy for every agent. Another commonly desired property for mechanism design is
individual rationality (IR): the agent’s utility of participating in the output of themechanism is at least the utility of the agent
if it did not participate at all. A mechanism is called truthful or strategyproof if it satisfies both IC and IR properties.
A classical result in mechanism design is the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism by Vickrey [20], Clarke [5], and
Groves [9]. The VCG mechanism applies to maximization problems where the objective function g(o, t) is simply the sum
of all agents’ valuations. A VCG mechanism is always truthful [9], and is the only truthful implementation, under mild
assumptions, to maximize the total valuation [8]. Although the family of VCGmechanisms is powerful, it has its limitations.
To use a VCGmechanism, we have to compute the exact solution thatmaximizes the total valuation of all agents. Thismakes
the mechanism computationally intractable for many optimization problems.
This work focuses on developing newmechanisms for strategic games that can be formulated as different variants of the
set cover problem, with three main objectives. First of all, each mechanism has to be strategyproof by providing incentives
(such as payments made by service-receiving agents, or service receivers, to service-providing agents, or service providers). In
addition, we aim to achieve the following objectives, which are sometimes at odds with each other and thus require proper
tradeoffs.
Value-efficiency: To make mechanisms tractable, we have to adopt approximation algorithms that compute only
approximately optimal outcomes. We say that a mechanism is α-value-efficient (or α-efficient for short) if
its output achieves a total valuation at least α times the optimal total valuation for all outcomes that permit
strategyproof mechanisms. For VCGmechanisms, replacing the exact algorithmwith an approximation algorithm
usually destroys incentive compatibility [16]. In this case, we shall design newmechanisms that preserve incentive
compatibility.
Observe that the value of the game defined here is different from the traditionally used social welfare in the
literature. The social welfare of a solution A is defined as the total valuation of the elements served by A, minus
the total cost of service providers inA. Although our mechanisms will not directlymaximize the social welfare of
the selected service providers and the served elements, in ourmechanisms, a set is selected to provide service only
if its cost is at most the total valuation of the elements to be served by this set.
Budget Balance (BB): Frequently, a game involves a set of agents (service receivers) who are willing to pay for receiving
services, and the mechanism needs to decide, based on the valuations of the services reported by all agents, the
subset S of agents who shall receive services and how much they are charged. Let C(S) be the total cost incurred
by providing services to all agents in S and ξi(S) be the cost charged to each agent i ∈ S, then cost-sharing method
is
1. Cost Recovery if
∑
i∈S ξi(S) ≥ C(S), i.e., the cost of providing the service is recovered from the agents.
2. Competitiveness if
∑
i∈S ξi(S) 6≥ C(S), i.e., no surplus is created from the payments of agents. Competitiveness
exists very often in practice due to the reason that if there does exist surplus, a competitor of the service provider
can further reduce the price to attract the agents.
If a cost-sharingmethod satisfies both cost recovery and competitiveness, it is budget-balanced, i.e.,
∑
i∈S ξi(S) =
C(S). It has been proved to be impossible to achieve both BB and efficiency [15], simultaneously. Thus, wemay seek
a β-budget-balanced cost-sharing method such that
∑
i∈S ξi(S) ≥ β · C(S), for some 0 < β < 1. Here, β is known
as the budget balance factor.
Fair Cost-Sharing: BB is only ameasure of how good the cost-sharingmethod is from a global point of view.We also need to
address how individual agentwould view the cost-sharingmethod;we need tomake themethod fair, encouraging
agents to participate. In this article, we will consider the following fairness measures [17]: cross-monotonicity (i.e.,
the cost share of an agent should not go up if more players require the service), and fairness under core (i.e., the cost
shares paid by any subset of agents should not exceed the minimum cost of providing the service to them alone,
hence they have no incentives to secede). We will also design mechanisms that avoid free-riders. Here, a served
element is free rider if its payment is less than certain shared value computed using some method.
No Positive Transfers (NPT): The cost share by every element is non-negative.
Voluntary Participation (VP): The utility of each agent is guaranteed to be non-negative if an element reports its bid
truthfully.
Consumer Sovereignty (CS): When an agent’s bid is large enough, and others’ bids are fixed, the agent will get the service.
In this article, we focus on designing strategyproofmechanisms that satisfy at least the following properties: NPT, VP, and
CS. Among mechanisms satisfying these properties, we want to design mechanisms that will find a set of service providers
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(and a corresponding charge to each of the served elements) to (approximately) maximize the valuation of served elements.
Certain fairness among served elements will also be considered.
1.2. Set cover games
A set cover game can be generally defined as the following. Let S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} be a collection of multisets (or sets for
short) of a universal set U = {e1, e2, . . . , en}. Element ei is specified with an element coverage requirement ri (i.e., it desires
to be covered ri times). The multiplicity of an element ei in a set Sj is denoted by kj,i. Let dmax be the maximum size of the
sets in S, i.e., dmax = maxj∑i kj,i. Here, nj =∑ni=1 kj,i is the cardinality of set Sj. Each Sj is associated with a cost cj. For any
X ⊆ S, let c(X) denote the total cost∑Sj∈X cj of the sets inX.
Many practical problems can be reasonably formulated as a set cover game defined above. For example, consider the
following scenario: a business can choose from a set of service providers S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} to provide services to a set of
service receivers U = {e1, e2, . . . , en}.
• With a fixed cost cj, each service provider Sj can provide services to a fixed subset of service receivers.
• Theremay be a limit kj,i on the number of units of service that a service provider Sj can provide to a service receiver ei. For
example, each service providermay be a cargo company that is transporting goods to various cities (the service receivers),
and the amount of goods that can be transported daily to a particular city is limited by the number of trains/trucks that
are going to that city everyday.
• Each service receiver ei may have a limit ri on the number of units of service that it desires to receive (and is willing to
pay for).
The outcome of the game is a cover A, which is a subset of S. The mechanism of the game is to determine an optimal
(or approximately optimal) outcome of the game, according to a pre-defined objective function. For example, for set cover
games where the sets are considered to be selfish agents whose total cost is to be minimized [14], the mechanism needs to
compute a coverAopt with the (approximately) minimum cost c(Aopt), among all coversA such that
∑
Sj∈A kj,i ≥ ri.
There may be different variants of games according to various conditions (with different objective functions):
1. Each service receiver ei has to receive at least ri units of service, and the costs incurred by the service providers will be
shared by the service receivers.
2. Each service receiver ei declares a bid bi,r for the r-th unit of service it shall receive, and is willing to pay for it only if the
assigned cost is at most bi,r .
3. Each service provider Sj declares a cost cj, and is willing to provide the service only if the payment received from elements
is at least cj.
1.3. Related work
Devanur et al. [6] studied the strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for the set cover games, with elements considered
to be selfish agents. In a game of this type, each element will declare its bid indicating its valuation of being covered,
and the mechanism uses the greedy algorithm [4] (referred as greedy mechanism, hereafter)to compute a cover with an
approximately minimum total cost. When every element needs to be covered at most once, i.e., ri = 1 for each ei, Devanur
et al. proved that the greedy mechanism is BB and strategyproof, and satisfies VP, NPT, and CS. In the meanwhile, Devanur
et al. also showed that the greedy mechanism is neither cross-monotonic nor group strategyproof. Here, a mechanism is
group strategyproofness if for any group of agents who collude in revealing their valuations, if no member is made worse off,
then no member is made better off. For general set cover game where each agent may request cover for multiple times, the
greedy mechanism is not strategyproof anymore.
The cross-monotonic property plays an vital role in the set cover game since, given any cross-monotonic sharingmethod,
one can explicitly design a budget-balanced and group-strategyproof mechanism that satisfies NPT, VP, and CS by using the
Moulin–Shenker mechanisms [15]. However, the cross-monotonic property does have its limitations [10]. Immorlica et al.
[10] provided bounds on BB factor for cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes.More specifically, Immorlica et al. [10] showed
that there is no cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme for the set cover game that achieves BB factor greater than O( 1dmax ),
where dmax is the maximum number of elements can be covered by any set.
Li et al. [14] extended thework of Devanur et al. [6] by providing a strategyproof cost-sharingmechanism formulti-cover
games. They also designed several cost-sharing schemes to fairly distribute the costs of the selected sets to the elements
covered, for the case that both sets and elements are unselfish (i.e., they will declare their costs/bids truthfully). The case
of set cover games where sets are considered as selfish agents was also considered. In [19], Li et al. focused on set cover
games when the elements are selfish agents with privately known valuations of being covered. They presented several
(approximately budget-balanced) truthful mechanisms that are approximately efficient.
Besides the BB issue, the efficiency or value efficiency issue is also critical in the set cover game. Although generally, the
efficiency is defined as the cost incurred by the sets and the valuations of the elements should be traded off in an optimal
way, there are different definitions that may lead to different outcomes. One common definition of efficiency is to require
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a mechanism to choose a subset of the elements to maximize the social welfare, where the social welfare is defined as the
total valuation of the elements minus the total cost of the sets selected. Several literatures [1,2] have ruled out the existence
of mechanisms that satisfy strategyproofness and BB, and maximize social welfare simultaneously. Moreover, Feigenbaum
et al. [7] showed that no strategyproof mechanism can recover α fraction of the maximum social welfare and β fraction
of the incurred cost simultaneously for any pair of constants α and β for the fixed-tree multicast. Recently, Roughgarden
et al. [18] proposed to define the efficiency as minimizing the social cost, where social cost is the sum of incurred cost of the
sets plus the valuation of the elements that do not receive the service. By their definition, they showed that there exists a
mechanism that achieves strategyproofness, BB, and approximately minimizes social cost for several games including the
Steiner tree problem.
1.4. Our results and organization of the article
In this article, we approach the question of multiset multi-cover set cover problem from a different perspective. We
design greedy set cover methods that are aware of the fact that the service receivers or the service providers are selfish
and rational. It still remains a challenge to study the case when both the service receivers and the service providers are
selfish and rational. When the elements to be covered are selfish agents with privately known valuations, we first show that
the strategyproof mechanism designed by a straightforward application of cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme is not α-
efficient for any α > 0. We then present a strategyproof charging mechanism such that the total valuation of the elements
covered is at least 1dmax times that of an optimal solution. Thismechanism, however, may have free-riders: some elements do
not have to pay at all and is still covered. We continue to present a strategyproof mechanism without free-riders and it is at
least 1dmax ln dmax -efficient.When the sets are also selfish agentswith privately knowncosts,we show that the cross-monotonic
payment-sharing schemedoes not induce a strategyproofmechanism: a set could lie its cost downward to improve its utility.
This is a sharp contrast to the theorem proved in [15] that a cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme implies a strategyproof
mechanism for selfish elements. The positive side is that the mechanism is still strategyproof for elements, i.e., no element
can lie about its bids to improve its utility.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some general properties of the set cover games
when the elements (also called service receivers) are selfish. In Section 3, we present a strategyproof mechanism for selfish
receivers and we prove that the mechanism is approximately efficient. We then extend our results for the case that the
elements may have multiple coverage requirement in Section 4. In Section 5, we study the scenario when both the service
providers (i.e., sets) and the service receivers (i.e., elements) are selfish agents. We show that a cross-monotonic payment-
sharing schemedoes not induce a strategyproofmechanism. In Section 6,wepresent our simulation results that demonstrate
the efficiencies of themechanisms presented in this article. We conclude our article in Section 7with the discussion of some
future works.
2. Selfish service receivers
Typically, the objective function of a game is defined to be the total valuation of the agents selected by the outcome of
the game. In set cover games, when sets are considered to be agents (e.g., [14]), maximizing the total valuation of all selected
agents is equivalent to minimizing the total cost of all selected sets. However, if the elements are considered to be agents,
the objective becomes tomaximize the total valuation of all elements (i.e., the sum of all the bids covered). Correspondingly,
we need to solve the following optimization problem:
Problem 1. Each element ei is associated with a coverage requirement ri as well as a set of bids Bi = {bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,ri} such
that bi,1 ≥ bi,2 ≥ · · · ≥ bi,ri . An assignment A is defined as the following:
(i) A ⊆ S;
(ii) a bid bi,r can be assigned to at most one set Spi(i,r) ∈ A;
(iii) For any Sj ∈ A, the assigned value νj(A) =∑pi(i,r)=j bi,r is at least cj. If this is the case, then Sj is called ‘‘affordable’’;
(iv) κj,i ≤ kj,i, where κj,i is the number of bids of ei assigned to Sj;
(v) if the number γi of assigned bids of ei is less than ri, then the assigned bids must be the first γi bids (with the greatest
bid values) of ei.
The total value V (A) = ∑Sj∈A νj(A) of an assignment A is the sum of all assigned bids in A. The problem is to find an
assignment with the maximum total value.
This problem is NP-hard. In fact, theweighted set packing problem,which is NP-complete, can be viewed as a special case
of this problem, with ri = 1 and bi,1 = 1 for each ei and cost cj = |Sj| (the cardinality of set Sj) for each Sj. Therefore, the VCG
mechanism cannot be used here if polynomial-time computability is required. In the rest of the article, we concentrate on
designing approximately efficient and polynomial-time computable strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy some properties
such as NPT, VP, and CS. Note a mechanism needs to compute a family of sets as an assignment, the number of times that
each of the elements will be served, and the charge to each of the served elements.
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All our methods follow a round-based greedy approach. Let Agrd be the current family of sets chosen by our greedy
approach. Initially,Agrd = ∅. In each round t = 1, 2, . . . , we select some set Sjt to cover some elements. We will describe
how we select the set Sjt for each round, in detail later. After the s-th round, we define the remaining required coverage r
′
i of
an element ei to be ri −∑st ′=1 κjt′ ,i. For any Sj 6∈ Agrd, the effective coverage k′j,i of ei by Sj is defined to be min{kj,i, r ′i }. The
effective value (or value for short) vj of Sj is, therefore,
∑n
i=1
∑k′j,i
r=1 bi,ri−r ′i+r and it is affordable after s-th round if vj ≥ cj.
One scheme to solve the preceding proposed problem is to select a set Sj as long as it is still affordable, and assign all
appropriate bids to Sj. However, in this case an elementmay find it profitable to lie about its bid, aswewill show in Section 3.
An alternative scheme is to pick a set only if it is individually affordable, as defined as the following:
Definition 1. A set Sj is individually affordable by d bids of elements contained in Sj if it contains at least d elements each
with a bid value at least cjd , for some d > 0.
Consequently, only the d largest bids are assigned to Sj, for themaximum d such that Sj is individually affordable by d bids.
Notice that here an implicit assumption is that each set Sj can selectively provide coverage to a subset of elements contained
by Sj. This is to prevent anybody from taking ‘‘free rides.’’
Definition 2. The modified value v˜j of Sj is defined to be the total value of the d elements contained in Sj with the d largest
bids for Sj, where d is the largest integer that the set Sj is individually affordable by d bids.
In essence, this scheme is contradictory to our objective of maximizing total valuation. We throw away the bids that can
otherwise be assigned (without incurring any extra cost) to a set. Further, we may discard an affordable set with a value
much greater than its cost (see Theorem1). However, to achieve strategyproofnesswhile avoiding free-riders, it is somewhat
another form of ‘‘price of anarchy’’, i.e., the amount of suffering to a society due to lack of coordination in a game.1
The following lemma gives upper bounds on the total value lost by enforcing individually affordable sets:
Theorem 1. For any set Sj ∈ S,
(1.1) if Sj is individually affordable, the modified value v˜j is at least 1ln dmax fraction of its value vj;
(1.2) if Sj is not individually affordable, its value is no more than ln dmax times the cost cj of Sj.
Proof. Let b1, b2, . . . , bx be the bids currently contained in Sj.Without loss of generality,we assume that b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bx.
If Sj is individually affordable by d bids but not by d+ 1 bids, we have the following inequalities:
(1) br <
cj
x+1−r ,∀r ≤ x− d;
(2) br ≥ cjd ,∀r > x− d.
Obviously, cj ≤ d · bx−d+1 ≤∑xr=x−d+1 br = v˜j. Therefore, we have
vj =
x−d∑
r=1
br +
x∑
r=x−d+1
br <
x−d∑
r=1
cj
x+ 1− r + v˜j
≤ (ln x− 1) · cj + v˜j ≤ ln x · v˜j ≤ ln dmax · v˜j.
This proves Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 1.2 can be proved similarly. 
The bound is tight, as we can have a set with a cost of 1+ , and with dmax bids 1dmax , 1dmax−1 , . . . , 12 , 1.
3. Single-cover games
In this section, we first study the case where each element only needs to be covered once, i.e., ri = 1 for each ei ∈ U . This
corresponds to the traditional set cover problem.
An obvious solution to designing a strategyproof mechanism for single-cover set cover games is to use a cross-
monotone cost-sharing scheme based on a theorem proved in [15]: a cross-monotone cost-sharing scheme implies a group-
strategyproof mechanism when the cost function is submodular, non-negative, and non-decreasing. A cost function C is
submodular if C(T1)+ C(T2) ≥ C(T1 ∪ T2)+ C(T1 ∩ T2) for any T1, T2, and is non-decreasing if C(T1) ≤ C(T2) for any T1 ⊆ T2.
For the set cover games, it is not difficult to show by example that the following cost functions are not submodular: the
cost c(Aopt) defined by the optimal cover Aopt of a set of elements, and the cost defined by the traditional greedy method
(i.e., in every round we select the set Sj with the minimum ratio of cost cj over the number of elements covered by Sj and not
covered by sets selected before).2 Even if a cost function is submodular, sometimes it may be NP-hard to compute this cost,
and thus we cannot use this cost function to design a strategyproof mechanism.
It was shown in [14] that there is a cost function that is indeed submodular: for each element ei ∈ T , we select the set Sj
with the least cost that covers ei (Least Cost Set, or LCS). LetAlcs(T ) be all sets selected as above to cover a set of elements T .
1 Price of anarchy [12] is defined as the ratio of the optimal social utility over the worst Nash equilibrium.
2 Notice that the greedy method we will present later is different from this traditional greedy set cover method.
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b  =2.5
c  =5
1 c  =42 c  =33
1b  =3.5 2 2
c  =5
1 c  =42 c  =33
1b  =3.5 2b  =2.5ξ  =4 ξ  =31
(a) Original game. (b) LCS output.
Fig. 1. An example that the mechanismM(ξ) is not efficient. In all the figures, sets are represented by ovals, while elements are represented by rectangles.
A dashed link (with arrow) between an oval and a rectangle denotes that the set contains one copy of the element. A solid link (with arrow) between an
oval and a rectangle denotes that the set is selected to cover the element.
Then c(Alcs) is submodular, non-decreasing, and non-negative. Notice that, if it is a multi-cover set cover game, each set Sj
is only eligible to cover an element ei kj,i times.
Given the cost function c(Alcs), it was shown in [14] that the cost-sharing method ξi(T ), defined as ξi(T ) =∑
Sj∈Alcs(T )
κj,i·cj∑
a κj,a
, is budget-balanced, cross-monotone and in a 12n -core. Here, κj,i is the number of bids of ei assigned to
Sj. For a single-cover set cover game, based on the method described in [15], given the single bid bi by each element ei, we
can define a mechanismM(ξ) as in Algorithm 1. The outcome is computed as the limit, denoted by U˜(ξ , b), of the following
inclusion monotonic sequence:
S0 = U; St+1 = {ei | bi ≥ ξi(St)}
and the charge byM(ξ) to an element ei is ξi(U˜(ξ , b)).
Algorithm 1Mechanism for single cover games via cost-sharing.
1: S0 = U; t = 0;
2: repeat
3: St+1 = {ei | bi ≥ ξi(St)}; t = t + 1;
4: until St−1 = St
5: The output of mechanismM(ξ) is U˜(ξ , b) = St ,
6: The charge byM(ξ) to an element ei is ξi(U˜(ξ , b)).
The following theorem is directly implied by the result in [15].
Theorem 2. The mechanism M(ξ) is group-strategyproof, budget-balanced, and meets NPT, CS, and VP.
However, this mechanism is not efficient at all: we will show by example that it is possible that the total valuation
achieved by this mechanism is 0, while the maximum total valuation achieved is a positive number. In other words, this
mechanism cannot be α-efficient for any α > 0. Fig. 1 illustrates such an example. It is easy to show that no element will
be selected by mechanism M(ξ). On the other hand, if we choose S2 to cover elements {e1, e2} and charge each elements
1
2 · c2 = 2, each element has a positive utility and the game has its maximum total valuation 3.5+2.5 = 6. Observe that, for
this special game instance, the solution that uses set S2 to provide services to elements e1 and e2 (and charge them each 2)
clearly has the properties of NPT, CS and VP.
Note that the social welfare achieved by the mechanism M(ξ) is 0, while the social welfare achieved by the preceding
simple solution is 6−4 = 2. Then, the above example shows that themechanismM(ξ) is not social efficient also, i.e., for any
number α,M(ξ) cannot guarantee that the social welfare achieved byM(ξ) is at least α fraction of the optimummechanism
for all possible game instances.
Next, in Algorithm 2, we describe a new greedy mechanism that computes for a single-cover game an approximately
optimal assignment Agrd. Starting with Agrd = ∅, in each round t ′ the algorithm adds to Agrd a set Sjt′ with the maximum
effective value.
The following theorem establishes an approximation bound for the algorithm.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 2 computes an assignmentAgrd with a total value V (Agrd) ≥ 1dmax · V (Aopt).
Proof. Let Sk be a set selected by Aopt (with some assigned bids). Before Algorithm 2 adds any set to Agrd, Sk is affordable.
When the algorithm finishes, no more set in S \Agrd is affordable, and therefore at least one bid assigned to Sk inAopt must
have been assigned to a set inAgrd (which could be Sk itself).
Let Sak be the first set inAgrd that takes bid(s) assigned to Sk inAopt . Consider the current value vak of Sak and the current
value vk of Sk right before Sak is added intoAgrd. Since till now no set inAgrd has taken a bid assigned to Sk inAopt , vk should
be at least the assigned value νk(Aopt) of Sk in Aopt . However, by the greedy nature of our algorithm, vk ≤ vak . Therefore,
we have νk(Aopt) ≤ vk ≤ vak = νak(Agrd), as we assign all existing bids in Sak to it when we add Sak intoAgrd (see Line 8 of
Algorithm 2).
This way, we can ‘‘charge’’ the assigned value νk(Aopt) of each set Sk ∈ Aopt to a set Sak ∈ Agrd with at least the same
assigned value. Since each set inAgrd can only take the bids assigned to at most dmax sets inAopt (and hence be charged at
most dmax times), the total value V (Aopt) ofAopt is at most dmax times the total value V (Agrd) ofAgrd. 
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Algorithm 2 Greedy mechanism for single-cover games.
1: Agrd←∅.
2: for all Sj ∈ S do
3: compute effective value vj.
4: end for
5: while S 6= ∅ do
6: pick set St in S with the maximum effective value vt .
7: Agrd←Agrd ∪ {St}, S←S \ {St}.
8: for all ei ∈ St do
9: pi(i, 1)←t .
10: remove ei from all Sj ∈ S.
11: end for
12: for all Sj ∈ S do
13: update effective value vj.
14: if vj < cj then
15: S←S \ {Sj}.
16: end if
17: end for
18: end while
3
b  =4b  =4 21
c  =51 c  =42 c  =3
2b  =4b  =4 21
c  =51 c  =42 c  =33
2 p  =43p  =5
ξ  =5 ξ  =41 2b  =4b  =4 21
c  =51 c  =42 c  =33
p  =43
ξ  =4 2b  =4b  =4 21
c  =51 c  =22 c  =33
2p  =5
ξ  =3.5 ξ  =1.51
(a) Sets–elements. (b) LCS output. (c) Selected elements. (d) Output if S2 lies.
Fig. 2. An example that a set can lie its cost to improve its utility when LCS is used as output.
It is easy to show that the above bound is tight by constructing an example.
Next, we show how to compute the payment charged to each element in a strategyproof mechanism. In many problems,
the total payment is often less than the total cost incurred by the service providers in order to guarantee strategyproofness
and therefore the mechanisms are not budget-balanced. However, it is important to note that even in this scenario we still
want to guarantee that the total valuation of the service receivers covered by any particular service provider is at least the
cost of this service provider; otherwise, it is not worthwhile to select this service provider in terms of the social efficiency.
When the mechanism runs into deficit, it is traditionally assumed that there is an external banker (e.g., the government)
who will subsidize the costs of the sets.
The payment pi,1 of each bid bi,1 can be decided according to Algorithm 3 using a round-based approach. Algorithm 3
examines all possible cases that an element ei can lie about its bid bi,1, while still ensuring that bi,1 is assigned to a set in
Agrd, and charge ei the minimum bid value in all these cases.
Intuitively, Algorithm 3 runs Algorithm 2without the participation of ei (i.e., not including bi,1 when evaluating the value
vj of each Sj 3 ei). As ei is ‘‘watching’’ the set selection process, every time a set St is picked, it would record for each set
Sj 3 ei, how much it needs to raise its bid bi,1 so that Sj can beat St in this round (so that Sj is selected and consequently bi,1
is assigned), as shown in Line 16 of Algorithm 3.
Just like in Algorithm 2, wemaintain a priority queue containing all sets using their weights as keys, so that in each round
we can extract the set with the maximum value. However, when a set Sj 3 ei becomes unaffordable (because of losing the
bids to sets already picked), we need to handle it differently. In this case, ei has to raise its bid bi,1 at least to cj−vj; otherwise,
Sj will still not be qualified to be selected. To beat a set St being picked, ei might have to raise its bid even further, a situation
already handled in Line 16. On the other hand, with a value equal to cj, it may already be sufficient for Sj to get picked; in
this case, ei does not need to report a bid more than cj − (vj − bi,1). This is handled in Line 12.
We have the following theorem on the above cost-sharing mechanism:
Theorem 4. The cost-sharing mechanism defined in Algorithm 3 is strategyproof.
Proof. It is easy to show that Algorithm 3 actually computes the minimum bid that an agent can report such that it is still
selected in the outcome if it is originally selected. Since the set cover game is a binary-demand game [11,13,3], in which
each element is either selected or not, and Algorithm 2 satisfies the monotonicity property (if an element is selected with
a bid b, then it will be selected with a higher bid) defined in [11], the result proved in [11] implies that Algorithm 3 is
strategyproof. 
Notice that Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 together may produce an output such that the payment by a certain element is
0. For example, see the set cover game illustrated by Fig. 2(a). It is easy to show that, according to Algorithm 3, the payments
by both elements e1 and e2 are 0 since each element can lie its bid to as low as 0 and still get covered.
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Algorithm 3 Computing payment pi,1 of ei in single-cover games.
1: pi,1←+∞; S′←∅; S′′←∅;Agrd←∅.
2: for all Sj ∈ S do
3: compute value vj.
4: if ei ∈ Sj then
5: wj←max{vj − bi,1, cj}, S′←S′ ∪ {Sj}.
6: else
7: wj←vj, S′′←S′′ ∪ {Sj}.
8: end if
9: end for
10: while S′ 6= ∅ do
11: pick set St in S′ ∪ S′′ with the maximumwt .
12: if St ∈ S′ then
13: S′←S′ \ {St}.
14: pi,1←min{pi,1, wt − (vt − bi,1)}.
15: else
16: S′′←S′′ \ {St};Agrd←Agrd ∪ {St}.
17: for all Sj ∈ S′ do
18: pi,1←min{pi,1, vt − (vj − bi,1)}.
19: end for
20: for all ex ∈ St do
21: remove ex from all Sj ∈ S′ ∪ S′′.
22: end for
23: for all Sj ∈ S′ ∪ S′′ do
24: update vj andwj.
25: if Sj ∈ S′′ and vj < cj then
26: S′′←S′′ \ {Sj}.
27: end if
28: if Sj ∈ S′ and vj + pi,1 < cj then
29: S′←S′ \ {Sj}.
30: end if
31: end for
32: end if
33: end while
To avoid this zero payment problem, we use a slightly different algorithm to determine the outcome of the game. Our
modified greedy method (described in Algorithm 4) instead selects only individually affordable sets. When a set Sj is added
into Agrd, the algorithm only assigns to Sj the largest d bids, such that Sj is individually affordable with d bids, for the
maximum such d.
Obviously, Algorithm 4 satisfies the monotone property defined in [11]: when an element ei was selected with a bid bi,1,
then it will be always selected with a bid bi,1 > bi,1. This monotone property implies that there is always a strategyproof
mechanism using Algorithm 4 to compute its output. It is easy to show that Algorithm 4 is a round-based greedy method
that satisfies the cross-independence property defined in [11]. Thus, the payment to each element can always be computed
in polynomial time. The algorithm that computes the payment in polynomial time is omitted here due to space limits.
We have the following theorems on the approximate value-efficiency of the modified greedy mechanism:
Theorem 5. Consider all mechanismsM′ in which only individually affordable sets are allowed to be picked. Then, the assignment
Agrd computed by Algorithm 4 has a total value of at least 1dmax · V (Aopt). Here, A′opt is the optimal assignment inM′ with the
largest total valuation.
The proof of Theorem 5 is similar to that of Theorem 3 and thus is omitted.
Theorem 6. Assume that all sets in S are initially individually affordable. Then, the assignment Agrd computed by Algorithm 4
has a total value of at least 12dmax · V (Aopt). Here,Aopt is the optimal assignment of all mechanisms that may allow sets that are
not individually affordable.
Proof. Let Sk be a set selected byAopt , and let b1, b2, . . . , bx be all the bids initially contained in Sk (not necessarily assigned
to Sk inAopt ). Since Sk is individually affordable at the beginning, there exists a d such that:
(1) br <
ck
x+1−r ,∀r ≤ x− d;
(2) br ≥ ckd ,∀r > x− d.
Therefore, the value of Sk is vk =∑xr=1 br , and the modified value of Sk is v˜k =∑xr=x−d+1 br .
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Algorithm 4 Improved greedy mechanism for single-cover games.
1: Agrd←∅.
2: for all Sj ∈ S do
3: compute the modified value v˜j.
4: end for
5: while S 6= ∅ do
6: pick set St in S with the maximummodified value v˜t .
7: Agrd←Agrd ∪ {St}, S←S \ {St}.
8: dt← the largest d such that the set St is individually affordable by d largest unsatisfied bids.
9: for all ei ∈ St do
10: if bi,1 is one of the largest dt unsatisfied bids in St then
11: pi(i, 1)←t
12: remove ei from all Sj ∈ S.
13: end if
14: end for
15: for all Sj ∈ S do
16: update the modified value v˜j.
17: if v˜j < cj then
18: S←S \ {Sj}.
19: end if
20: end for
21: end while
Again, after the greedy mechanism finishes, Sk must have at least one of the bids bx−d+1, bx−d+2, . . . , bx assigned to a set
added intoAgrd. Let Sak be the first set chosen byAgrd that takes a bid by, where x− d+ 1 ≤ y ≤ x. Then, at the moment Sak
is selected, we have v˜k ≤ v˜ak = νak(Agrd) due to the nature of the greedy mechanism. Further, since by ≥ ckd , we have
x−d∑
r=1
br < ck ·
(
x−d∑
r=1
1
x+ 1− r
)
≤ by · d ·
(
x−d∑
r=1
1
x+ 1− r
)
= by · d · (Hx − Hd) < by · d · (1+ ln x− ln d)
≤ by · x ≤ by · dmax.
Here, Hx is the harmonic function, i.e., Hx = 1+ 12 + 13 + · · · + 1x . Therefore, to bound the value vk of each Sk ∈ Aopt , we
split it into two different parts and bound them separately: the part v˜k is no more than νak(Agrd), and the remaining part
vk − v˜k (which is exactly the sum of the bids b1, . . . , bx−d) is no more than dmax · by.
Now, consider each set Sq ∈ Agrd. It is assigned with no more than dmax bids that are assigned to different sets in Aopt ,
and therefore may be charged at most dmax times for its assigned value νak(Agrd). Further, for each of its assigned bids bz , Sq
may be charged for dmax times bz , if bz is assigned to a set in Aopt . Therefore, in total each Sq ∈ Agrd is charged for at most
2dmax times its assigned value, implying that
2dmax · V (Agrd) = 2dmax ·
∑
Sq∈Agrd
v˜q ≥
∑
Sk∈Aopt
vk
≥
∑
Sk∈Aopt
νk(Aopt) = V (Aopt).
This finishes the proof. 
Unfortunately, the preceding algorithm still cannot guarantee a bound on the value-efficiency for all possible games.
Consider a set cover instance with one set that costs 1 +  and k bids 1/k, 1/k − 1, . . ., 1/2, 1. Clearly, Aopt has efficiency
approximately Hk ' ln k. The preceding algorithm gives 0 since the set is not ‘individiually affordable’ for any d. It remains
an interesting future work to design mechanisms that guarantee a certain bound on value-efficiency for all set cover games.
To compute the payment of each element ei for its assigned bid, we use an algorithm similar to Algorithm 3. The only
differences are:
• in Line 3, we compute the modified values for the sets;
• in Line 5, we replace vj − bi,1 by the modified value of Sj after bid bi,1 is removed (or, equivalently, bi,1 is considered to
be 0);
• in Line 12, ei has to raise its bid bi,1 not only to make sure that St is individually affordable, but also to let bi,1 become one
of the largest d bids in St , for some d > 0 such that St is individually affordable by d bids;• in Line 16, ei has to raise its bid bi,1 to make sure that themodified value of a certain set Sj 3 ei is larger than themodified
value of the set St currently being selected.
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Furthermore, when an element ei is covered by a set that is individually affordable by d elements, then the bid of ei cannot
be less than cj/d for some Sj, which is not necessarily the set covering ei. Thus, we know the payment by element ei is at
least cj/d, which prevents free-riders.
4. Multi-cover games
Theorem3 and Theorems 5 and 6 can easily be extended to the case ofmulti-cover. However,when it comes to computing
payments, there is a problem: in the multi-cover case, an element can lie in different ways, and it may not be of its best
interest if it achieves the maximum utility in the first bid (or the last bid). In that case, how can we compute payments
efficiently? In this section, we study the multi-cover games.
To overcome the computational complexity of computing payments, we need to instead use a different greedy
mechanism to compute the outcome of the game. This algorithm is the same as Algorithm 3 of [14]. For the completeness
of our presentation, we include it (with minor notational changes) as Algorithm 5 here.
Algorithm 5 Strategyproof charging mechanism for multi-cover games.
1: Agrd←∅.
2: for all ei ∈ U do
3: r ′i←ri.
4: end for
5: while S 6= ∅ do
6: pick an individually affordable set St ∈ S (by d bids) with the smallest average cost ctd .
7: Agrd←Agrd ∪ {St}, S←S \ {St}.
8: for all element ei ∈ St with bri−r ′i+1 ≥ ctd do
9: pi,ri−r ′i+1← ctd .
10: pi(i, ri − r ′i + 1)←t .
11: r ′i←r ′i − 1.
12: end for
13: for all Sj ∈ S do
14: update value v˜j.
15: if v˜j < cj then
16: S←S \ {Sj}.
17: end if
18: end for
19: end while
In [14] it is shown that this mechanism produces an outcome with a total cost no more than ln dmax times the total cost
of an optimal outcome. In the following, we show that the outcome is also approximately efficient with respect to the total
valuation of the assigned (covered) bids.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 5 (Algorithm 3 of [14]) defines a budget-balanced and strategyproof mechanism. Further, it is 1dmaxHdmax -
efficient, if all sets are individually affordable initially.
Proof. The budget-balance part is obvious. The proof for strategyproofness is the same as in [14]. In the following, we prove
that this mechanism is 1dmaxHdmax -efficient. Let Sk be a set inAopt . When Algorithm 5 finishes, at least one bid assigned to Sk
in Aopt must have been assigned to a set in Agrd. Otherwise, due to the monotonicity of the bids, for each element ei, the
currently available bids should be at least the ones assigned to Sk inAopt . This implies that Sk is still individually affordable,
a contradiction.
Let Bk = {b1, b2, . . . , bx} be all x bids assigned to Sk in Aopt and without loss of generality let B′k = {b1, b2, . . . , by} be
the subset of Bk containing all the bids already assigned to sets inAgrd right after Sk becomes individually unaffordable. For
our convenience, we assume that b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤ by. Clearly, by+1, by+2, . . . , bx cannot make Sk individually affordable.
On the other hand, we claim that by belongs to a subset of Sk that makes Sk individually affordable; otherwise, losing B′k will
not make Sk individually unaffordable. Hence, we have
(1)
∑x
r=y+1 br <
∑x
r=y+1
ck
x−r+1 ,
(2) by ≥ ckdmax .
Therefore,
νk(Aopt) =
y∑
r=1
br +
x∑
r=y+1
br ≤
y∑
r=1
by +
x∑
r=y+1
ck
x− r + 1
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≤ by ·
y∑
r=1
dmax
x− r + 1 + dmax · by ·
x∑
r=y+1
1
x− r + 1
≤ dmax · by ·
x∑
r=1
1
x− r + 1 ≤ dmax · Hdmax · by.
Let Sak be the set in Agrd that is assigned with bid by. Then we can ‘‘charge’’ Sak for dmax · Hdmax times by. Therefore, the
value V (Aopt) ofAopt is no more than dmax · Hdmax times the value V (Agrd) ofAgrd.
This finishes the proof. 
The above bound is tight. We may construct an example with d2max elements, e1,1, e1,2, . . . , edmax,dmax , and dmax + 1 sets,
Sj = {ej,1, ej,2, . . . , ej,dmax} for 1 ≤ j ≤ dmax and Sdmax+1 = {e1,1, e2,1, . . . , edmax,1}. The bid for each element eu,v is 1 +  if
v = 1 or dmaxdmax−v+1 if v > 1, and the cost of each set Sj is dmax +  if j ≤ dmax or dmax2 if j = dmax + 1. Obviously, all these sets
are individually affordable at the beginning. Algorithm 5 picks set Sdmax+1 first, because its average shared cost, which is
1
2 , is
the smallest among all sets. However, once Sdmax+1 is added intoAgrd, none of the remaining sets is individually affordable,
and thus the algorithm terminates with an assignment with a value dmax · (1+ ). The optimal assignment is to select sets
S1, S2, . . . , Sdmax , with a total value of d
2
max · (Hdmax + ).
5. Selfish service providers and receivers
So far, we assume that the cost of each set is publicly known or each set will truthfully declare its cost. In practice, it is
possible that each set could also be a selfish agent that will maximize its own benefit, i.e., it will provide the service only if it
receives a payment by some elements (not necessarily the elements covered by itself) large enough to cover its cost. In [14],
Li et al. designed several truthful payment schemes to selfish sets such that each set maximizes its utility when it truthfully
declares its cost and the covered elements will pay whatever the charge computed by the mechanism. They also designed a
payment-sharing scheme that is budget-balanced and in the core.
To complete the study, in this section, we study the scenario when both the sets and the elements are individual selfish
agents: each set Sj has a privately known cost cj, while each element ei has a privately known bid bi,r for the r-th unit of
service it shall receive and is willing to pay for it only if the assigned cost is at most bi,r . It is well known that a cross-
monotone cost-sharing scheme implies a strategyproof mechanism [15]. Unfortunately, since the sets are selfish agents, it
is impossible to design any cost-sharing scheme here, and the best we can do is to design some payment-sharing scheme. It
was shown in [21] that a cross-monotone payment-sharing scheme does not necessarily induce a strategyproof mechanism
by using multicast as a running example: a relay node could lie its cost upward or downward to improve its utility.
Given a subset of elements T ⊆ U and their coverage requirement ri for ei ∈ T , a collection of multisets S, and each set
Sj ∈ S with cost cj, let MS be a strategyproof mechanism for selfish elements that will determine which sets from S will
be selected to provide the coverage to all elements T , and the payment pj to each set Sj. We assume that the mechanism is
normalized: the payment to a unselected set Sj is always 0. Based on twomonotonic output methods, the traditional greedy
set cover method (denoted as GRD) and LCS method for each element, Li et al. [14] designed two strategyproof mechanisms
for the set cover games.
Let E(Sj, c, T ,MS) be the set of elements covered by Sj in the output ofMS . In the remaining of the article, we assume that
the mechanismMS satisfies the property that if a set Sj increases its cost then the set of elements covered by Sj in the output
of MS will not increase, i.e., E(Sj, c|jd, T ,MS) ⊆ E(Sj, c, T ,MS) for d > cj. Here, c|jd = (c1, . . . , cj−1, d, cj+1, . . . , cm), i.e.,
each agent k 6= j reports its cost ck except that agent j reports cost d. This property is satisfied by all the methods currently
known for the set cover games.
Let ξi,j(T ) be the shared payment by element ei for its jth copy when the set of elements to be covered is T , given a
strategyproof payment scheme MS to all sets. Following the method described in [15], given the set U of n elements and
their bids B1, . . . , Bn we can compute the outcome U˜(ξ , B) as the limit of the following inclusion monotonic sequence:
S0 = U; St+1 = {ei | bi,j ≥ ξi,j(St)}. Notice that here we have to recompute the payments to all sets, and thus the shared
payments by all elements, when the set of elements to be covered changed from St to St+1. In other words, we define a
mechanismME(ξ) associated with the payment-sharing method ξ as follows: the set of elements to be covered is U˜(ξ , B),
the charge to the j-th copy of element ei is ξi,j(U˜(ξ , B)) if ei ∈ U˜(ξ , B); otherwise, its charge is 0. Based on the strategyproof
mechanism using LCS as output for the set cover games, Li et al. [14] designed a payment-sharingmechanism that is budget-
balanced, cross-monotone, and in the core.
In the remaining of the article, we assume that for the payment-sharingmechanism ξ , the payment pj to the set Sj is only
shared among the elements, i.e., E(Sj, c, T ,MS), covered by Sj. This property is satisfied by the payment-sharing methods
studied in [14] for the set cover games.
For the set cover games, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 8. For the set cover games with selfish sets and elements, a strategyproof mechanism MS to sets and a cross-monotone
payment-sharing scheme ξ for elements imply that in mechanism ME each set Sj cannot improve its utility by lying upward its
cost.
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Proof. At the current moment, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that any set does not change its declared cost. Thus, the
payment to each set will not change. Since the payment-sharing scheme is cross-monotone, any group of elements cannot
change their bids to increase the utility of some elements without decreasing the utility of some other elements in this
group.
We then show that each set indeed does not have incentives to lie about its cost upward. Notice that since the payment
scheme to each set is strategyproof by assumption, any set cannot lie about its cost to increase its payment when it is
selected to cover some elements. In other words, its utility cannot be increased as long as it is selected in the final outcome.
Consequently, the only scenario that a selfish set Sj may increase its utility is that (1) it is selected to cover some elements
initially when it declares its true cost cj and each element ei is assumed to have an infinitely large bid bi,j3; (2) it is not
selected if it declares its true cost cj because the corresponding charges to some elements are not affordable, i.e., larger than
the bids of elements4; and (3) it will be selected if it declares a false cost c j, i.e., the corresponding charges will be no more
than the bids of elements. We will show that this is impossible if c j > cj.
Assume that the declared costs of all sets other than Sj are fixed and the declared bids of all elements are fixed. Let pj be
the payment to set Sj. Since the payment scheme to sets are strategyproof, pj is independent of its declared cost. If the set Sj
lies its cost upward as c j > cj, then the set of elements that will be covered by Sj is only a subset of the elements previously
covered by Sj. Since the payment pj to Sj is only shared among elements E(Sj, c|jc j, T ,MS), the cross-monotonicity of the
payment-sharing method ξ implies that the shared payment of each element ei in E(Sj, c|jc j, T ,MS) is not smaller than its
shared payment if Sj did not lie its cost. Remember that the set Sj is not affordable when it reports its cost cj, i.e., the total
amount of bids of elements in E(Sj, c, T ,MS) for their copy covered by Sj is less than pj. Consequently, the set Sj is still not
affordable when it reports its cost as c j > cj. This finishes the proof. 
Unfortunately, for the set cover games, we show that a strategyproof mechanism MS to sets and a cross-monotone
payment-sharing scheme ξ do not induce a strategyproofmechanismME for each element. Fig. 2 illustrates such an example
when LCS is used as the output, a set sj can lie its cost downward to improve its utility from 0 to pj − cj. A similar example
can be constructed when the traditional greedy method is used as the output. When set S2 is truthful, although LCS will
select it to cover element e1 with payment p2 = 5, but the corresponding sharing by e1 is ξ1 = 5, which is larger than its
bid b1,1 = 4. Consequently, set S2 will not be selected and element e1 will not be covered (see Fig. 2(c)). On the other hand,
if S2 lies its cost downward to c2 = 2, its payment is still p2 = 5, but now, since it covers elements e1 and e2, the shared
payments by e1 and e2 become ξ1 = 3.5 and ξ2 = 1.5. Thus, the set S2 becomes affordable by elements e1 and e2.
We leave it for the future work to study whether there exists a strategyproof mechanism to select selfish sets to cover
selfish elements using the combination of a strategyproof mechanism for sets, and a good payment-sharing method for
elements. Notice that since this is still a binary-demand game [11], any truthful mechanism must use an output method
that is monotone for both the sets and elements: when a selected set decreases its cost, it will still be selected to provide
service; when a selected receiver increases its bid, it will still be selected to receive service.
6. Simulation studies
In this article, we presented three different mechanisms for single-cover set cover games. Mechanism 1 (called method
1 in Figs. 3 and 4) is based on a cross-monotone cost-sharing scheme and thus is budget-balanced and group-strategyproof.
However, in the worse case it cannot be α-efficient for any α > 0. Mechanism 2 (called method 2 in our simulations) based
on Algorithms 2 and 3 produces an output that has a total valuation at least 1dmax of the optimal. However, this mechanism
may charge an element 0 payment; thus, it cannot be β-budget-balance for any β > 0. Mechanism 3 (calledmethod 3 in our
simulations) based on Algorithm 4 avoids this zero payment problem, but it is only 12dmax -efficient under some assumptions.
Further, the general mechanism based on Algorithm 5 produces a budget-balanced mechanism that is 1dmax·Hdmax -efficient.
We conducted extensive simulations to study the actual total valuations of all these three methods compared with the
total valuations of all elements in this game. Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate our simulation results. In our simulations, we run 1000
instances for each setting and then take the average performances of these 1000 instances as a point plotted in the figures.
We either fixed the number n of elements or the number of sets. In Fig. 3, we fixed the number of sets as 50. In Fig. 3(a), we set
the element cost as a real number between 0 and 1; the number of elements per set is randomly chosen between [ nm , 5nm ]; and
the cost of each set Si is randomly chosen between [ |Si|4 , 3|Si|4 ]. In Fig. 3(b), we set the element cost as a real number between
1 and 2; the number of elements per set is randomly chosen between [ nm , 5nm ]; and the cost of each set Si is randomly chosen
between [|Si|, 2|Si|]. In Fig. 3(c), we set the element cost as a real number between 1 and 2; the number of elements per
set is randomly chosen between [ nm , 11nm ]; and the cost of each set Si is randomly chosen between [|Si|, 2|Si|]. In Fig. 4, we
fixed the number of elements as 200. In Fig. 4(a), we set the element cost as a real number between 0 and 1; the number
of elements per set is randomly chosen between [ nm , 5nm ]; and the cost of each set Si is randomly chosen between [ |Si|4 , 3|Si|4 ].
3 We need this condition because otherwise its payment will always be no more than its cost from the strategyproof property. Notice that when it is not
selected its utility is 0.
4 This condition makes sure that it does have incentives to lie. Otherwise its payment will be fixed when it is selected.
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(a) Low cost elements. (b) Smaller sets. (c) Larger sets.
Fig. 3. Efficiency achieved by different methods compared with the total valuations. Here, the number of sets is fixed as 50.
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Fig. 4. Efficiency achieved by different methods compared with the total valuations. Here, the number of elements is fixed as 200.
Table 1
Summary of mechanisms presented in this article.
Mechanism Efficiency Budget-balance Truthful
Alg. 1 0 1 Group-strategyproof
Alg. (2, 3) 1dmax 0 Strategyproof
Alg. 4 12dmax > 0 Strategyproof
Alg. 5 1dmax ·Hdmax 1 Strategyproof
In Fig. 4(b), we set the element cost as a real number between 1 and 2; the number of elements per set is randomly chosen
between [ nm , 5nm ]; and the cost of each set Si is randomly chosen between [|Si|, 2|Si|]. In Fig. 4(c), we set the element cost as a
real number between 1 and 2; the number of elements per set is randomly chosen between [ nm , 11nm ]; and the cost of each set
Si is randomly chosen between [|Si|, 2|Si|]. In all our simulations, we found that the first mechanism (based on cost-sharing)
and the second mechanism have similar efficiencies in practice. Remember that the second mechanism has a theoretically
proven efficiency bound,while there is no bound for the firstmechanism. As expected, the thirdmechanismalways produces
an output that has less total valuations than the other two methods, since it only picks sets that are individually affordable.
7. Conclusion
Strategyproof mechanism design has recently attracted a significant attention among several research communities.
In this article, we focused the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents with privately known valuations of
being covered. We presented several (approximately budget-balanced) strategyproof mechanisms that are approximately
efficient, which are summarized in Table 1. When the service providers (i.e. sets) are also selfish, we show that a cross-
monotonic payment-sharing scheme does not necessarily induce a strategyproof mechanism. This is a sharp contrast to the
well-known fact [15] that a cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme always implies a strategyproof mechanism.
This article does not intend to solve all the problems related to designing strategyproof mechanisms for the set cover
games. There are several interesting and also important problems left open for future works.
1. Whether the approximation bounds of efficiency given by several strategyproof mechanisms are tight? Notice that we
showed that these bounds are tight for these mechanisms presented here. It is unknown whether there exist some other
mechanisms with asymptotically better approximation bounds on efficiency.
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2. It is well known that there is no mechanism that is both efficient and budget-balanced. Then, what is the best possible
tradeoffs between the efficiency and the budget-balance. Is there any bound on α · β for an α-efficient and β-budget-
balanced mechanisms for the set cover games? We know for sure that 1dmax·Hdmax ≤ α · β < 1, when the original optimal
solution admits only individually affordable sets.
3. What are the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for a strategyproof mechanism MS for selfish sets and a payment-
sharing scheme ξ , such that the induced mechanismME discussed in Section 5 is strategyproof?
4. The last question is, when both the providers and the elements are selfish agents, to design a strategyproof mechanism
(not necessarily using the approach discussed in Section 5) that is approximately efficient. Remember that the total
efficiency of an output of this game now becomes the total valuation of selected to-be-covered elements minus the total
cost of the selected sets that cover these elements.
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